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This paper takes a high level view of the dynamics of the Cold War and their 
influence on management and governance. It addresses the pre-Cold War origins of 
key components of the information infrastructure underpinning the networked 
organisation of manufacture and service delivery. These embody practices that can 
be traced back to the impetus given by the prosecution of WWII by the allies to 
scientific management, and the transfer of these efforts to the Cold War continuation 
of conflict.  
The Cold War effort supported by both scientific management and experience 
gained in the management of wartime production. These in turn required and 
reinforced an intelligence led understanding of both production and control which 
became embedded in post war organisations. The end of the “bi-polar Discipline 
(Ohmae, 1990) of the Cold War has led to a one-sided hegemonic view of this model. 
This is finally being challenged by the very capabilities built in to its core. As we move 
into a post Cold War environment the panopticon created by the surveillance and 
control approach to management and governance is finally under challenge by a 
reverse panopticon facilitated by the internet and webspace. This is evident in the  
continuing tension over rival formulations of information and knowledge management 
as either a technical task of information retrieval and knowledge extraction delivering 
explicit understanding in the tradition of Taylor, or as a softer form of support for  
collective communities of practice premised on tacit knowing. The re-formulation of 
Cold War polarities into a War on Terrorism has intensified this process. 
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Bletchley Park – a case of institutional forgetting? 
Shortly before the fiftieth anniversary of the end of WWII a museum of computing 
was opened at the former site of the Government Code and Cypher School (GCCS) 
at Bletchley Park, fifty miles north of London. The exhibits reflected the impact of pre-
war, wartime and post-war developments in cryptography and computing.  
The significance of the site had been revealed to the general public by the 
publication of F.W. Winterbotham’s ‘The Ultra Secret’ in 1974. In the following 
decades a number of documentary and fictional accounts of the work undertaken by 
GCCS appeared and provided the basis for a revisionist account of World War II. 
These accounts contradicted many assumptions implicit in the established view of a 
British victory based around Churchillian “Blood toil sweat & tears” plus the judicious 
use of operations research techniques. Instead it was revealed that at key points in 
the war allied commanders had access to German high command orders before their 
intended recipients, via the use of captured or purloined Enigma coding machines 
and the computational analysis of intercepted signals traffic.  
Because of Cold War concerns for secrecy, the wartime creation of the Colossus 
electronic computer used to calculate settings on the German Enigma encryption 
machines was only revealed fully in 1975. Alan Turing, one of its key developers was 
cast as the central heroic and eccentric genius. In the best British tradition, 
fictionalised accounts of the work of Turing and his colleagues emphasised a small 
group of boffins in a remote country house and the documentary accounts of 
survivors of the key groups at Bletchley Park tell of inspirational breakthroughs by 
individuals and small teams. The Taylorist organisation for the volume production of 
information from a vast range of intercepted messages contradicts the carefully 
cultivated image of lonely genius and individual inspiration. The creation of massive 
databases of signals traffic and the development of increasingly sophisticated traffic 
analysis techniques, not the discovery of the content of individual messages, led to 
many of the significant results produced. Much of the site is still covered by 
temporary and permanent buildings occupied by the 8,000 workers, many female, 
who made use of state-of-the-art data processing technologies technology in the 
form of Hollerith tabulators and card indexes.  
Turing’s fame had already been established by his early specification for a 
generalised computational machine (Turing 1936/7) and as the “father” of artificial 
intelligence through his formulation of a test to determine whether a machine was 
exhibiting intelligence. In this respect Turing has been most widely influential in 
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creating the popular (and misconceived) idea that computers are already capable of 
many of the objectives he set for them in the thirties and forties. Given that Turing’s 
famous test for machine intelligence (Turing 1950) initially speculated on the ability to 
distinguish between male and female respondents via teletype communication, and 
only then discussed a human versus machine distinction, the gender blindness of 
most accounts of Bletchley Park is intriguing. For example, it was a low ranking Wren 
who alerted the Admiralty to an imminent sortie by the battle-cruiser Scharnhorst on 
the basis of signals traffic analysis on Xmas eve 1942, allowing its destruction. Runte 
and Mills (2003) describe the broader consequences of the suppression of this 
gender aspect of the war-time systems of material and knowledge production. 
The deployment of computer-based information systems in commercial 
organisations diffused a particular model of strategic and operational management. 
Individuals who passed through Bletchley Park played a leading role in the post-war 
development of electronic computing, both at Manchester University in Britain and in 
the MIT Whirlwind project in the U.S. The sharing of intelligence and knowledge 
between the U.K. and the U.S. meant that with the destruction of the British records, 
the reconstruction of the Colossus computer, the star exhibit of the Bletchley Park 
museum, was expedited by archival information only available from U.S. Sources 
(Sale, 1998). 
By the time the gaps had been filled in the wartime narrative, however, the history 
of electronic computing had been constructed around the range of successor projects 
to the secret British efforts. Despite the close relationship to the U.S. nuclear 
weapons programme (see York 1976 for a discussion of von Neuman’s motivation in 
separating programme instructions from data), these had long been in the public 
realm.  
Technocratic Continuities: Taylor, Ford and McNamara 
The narrative underpinning the Cold War period and climaxing with Robert 
MacNamara’s incumbency as U.S. Secretary of State was one of rational analysis of 
quantified data, which placed scientific management at the centre of national 
survival. As Klein (2003) points out, this framework was embodied in the accepted 
understanding of technology management. However, the foundations for the 
“military-industrial complex” identified by US President Dwight Eisenhower in his 
farewell address were laid in the period leading up to World War II. Rearmament, 
mobilisation and the associated managerial methods formed the basis of those used 
in the Cold War. The strategic distribution of production during the war laid the basis 
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for post-war policies of "complementarity", (Little & Grieco 2003) and the same logic 
of distribution of production applied to the nuclear age. 
While the U.S. military industrial complex is a product of the impact of World War 
II and the Cold War on science and technology policy, it also reflects a pre-war 
technocratic sensibility. This had been given a formal expression in the political flux 
immediately before the implementation of the Roosevelt administration's "New Deal" 
programme. A Technocrat Movement rose to short-lived national prominence in the 
United States on a political programme of technical rationality. The Movement aimed 
to place engineers in charge of all facets of society, claiming that the economy would 
prosper in the hands of engineers. Developing Veblen's (1904) conception of the role 
of technical workers, the Technocrat Movement adopted energy consumption as a 
single unifying metric through which the rational management of economy and 
society could be achieved. Ultimately, according to Akin (1977), the movement 
withered precisely because its narrow technicism precluded the formulation of a 
programme of political action. The political agenda lost momentum in the face of the 
success of the New Deal, but the Second World War gave an added impetus to the 
underlying view that problems, however complex were amenable to quantitative 
analysis, provided it was sufficiently sophisticated. 
The continuity of technocracy pre and post World War II needs to be emphasised. 
Belief in the power of technical rationality to deal with almost any economic or social 
problem has proved enduring. It received reinforcement through the comparative 
success of the New Deal policies in the U.S. and the successful application of new 
management techniques during the Second World War. The rapid advances in 
military and other technologies ensured a continuing acceptance of such views in the 
post-war period. One former Technocrat Society member, the engineer Richard 
Buckminster Fuller, promoted the original principles up to the end of the nineteen 
sixties. The career of Robert MacNamara, as narrated by Halberstam (1971), offers a 
paradigm of this post-war flowering of technocratic consciousness. MacNamara’s 
career in the automotive industry, government and the World Bank reflects the 
movement of these sensibilities from industry to governance and development. 
The justification for the technocratic mind set can be seen in “Operation 
Paperclip”, the clandestine transfer of knowledge and technology from Nazi Germany 
to the U.S.A. at the onset of the Cold War. The first person account provided by 
Amtman (1988) shows the critical impact of this design input to U.S. front-line 
aerospace technology over the following decades. However, the absorptive capacity 
which allowed the U.S. beneficiaries to exploit this German research demonstrated 
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that superior organisation of production was as central to allied superiority as the 
quality of individual designs. Coupled with intelligence superiority, this had proved 
decisive, a lesson carried forward to the new confrontation. 
Following the onset of the Cold War, the defeated combatants of World War II 
faced futures almost as diverse as the former allies. The reconstruction of these 
nations was rapidly reframed as the strengthening of bulwarks against communism. 
Italy was incorporated into the western alliance as a member of NATO, with a divided 
Germany providing a front line state for each bloc.  
It could be argued that Cold War strategy elevated technocracy above 
democracy. Johnson (1983) illustrates the continuity of personnel between the post-
War Ministry of International Trade and Industry (MITI) and the pre-war technocrats 
of the administration of Manchukuo, Japanese occupied Manchuria. U.S. influenced 
constitutions were imposed on Japan and Germany, but the former Japanese 
colonies of  Taiwan and South Korea benefited primarily from the attention of US 
advice in technical development and productive capacity with democratic 
development coming only late in the Cold War period.  
U.S. aid during the occupation of Japan led to the export of Deming’s statistical 
approach to quality control. When the Japanese added this to Taylorism and Fordism 
the resulting Toyota-ism became the benchmark for manufacturers1. 
The NSA and Cold War Surveillance: “Computers by the Acre” 
In the U.K. Churchill had ordered the physical destruction of key equipment and 
files at Bletchley Park on the cessation of hostilities in 1945, effectively concealing 
the wartime contribution of code breaking. However, the Government 
Communications Headquarters (GCHQ) was established in 1946 as the post-war 
successor of the Government Code and Cipher School. In the U.S. the Signals 
Intelligence Service, based in Arlington Hall, Virginia, and comparable in its origins to 
GCCS re-emerged in 1952 as the National Security Agency (NSA).  
Bamford (1983) provides a history of the NSA which characterises its Cold War 
resource levels as computer capacity measured by the acre. According to its website, 
                                                          
1 Japan, as a relatively demilitarised buffer against a newly Communist China, was free to put 
its intelligence ingenuity into commercial organisations such as the Nomura Institute. Bill 
Abernathy remarked that his own options on graduation as an engineer were between spy 
satellites and washing machines. Japanese graduates had no such tempting alternative to 
consumer durables indeed, the co-founders of Sony ere displaced from the Imperial Navy 
guided missile programme. Hayes and Abernathy (1980) argue the consequences of this 
situation for competitive performance of U.S. industry. 
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the NSA is currently the second largest user of electrical power in Maryland with an 
annual bill in excess of $21 million.  
A range of significant innovations in computational capability followed from the 
capacity required by both code breakers and the developers of nuclear weapons. 
York’s narrative of the post-Manhattan project technologies and politics (York, 1976) 
was noted earlier. During and after the Cold War the NSA led significant initiatives in 
the development of computing. It promoted joint development with IBM of second 
generation general computers with features such as the high speed tape drives, 
prominent in every sixties movie featuring computers. They also sponsored the first 
Cray supercomputers and in 1990 established a Special Processing laboratory for in-
house fabrication of highly specialised micro-electronic devices.  
Innovations such as finite element analysis in engineering calculation and the 
related practice of constructing production aircraft without physical prototypes 
(Sabbagh, 1995) as well as the mathematical modelling which allows “in-silico” 
pharmaceutical development make use of massive computational power first 
developed either for code breaking or for the mathematical simulation of nuclear 
explosions.  
This continuing role of the signals intelligence community at the cutting-edge of 
computing developments in the post war period has ensured that the information 
economy is inseparable from the surveillance state. In some ways the end of the 
Cold War simply continued the blurring of distinctions between military and civil 
categories of security and surveillance. The Enigma machine, the focus of the 
attentions of Bletchley Park was itself originally a commercial product touted at pre-
war trade shows and used by German state railways for commercial 
communications, as well a by the Wehrmacht.  
In the U.K. the post war reactivation of GCHQ, was closely followed by civilian 
scientific and commercial applications of electronic computers. The Lyons Electronic 
Office effectively created the key concepts of management information systems at a 
stroke. However the low profile of Bletchley Park allowed an alternative narrative to 
be constructed. As recently as December 2000, John King of the University of 
Michigan (2000) provided a key note address to the International Conference for 
Information Systems in Brisbane 2000 which traced the post-war history of 
commercial computing with no mention of the critical LEO innovations. 
The established narrative, is however, a cold War one, leading from the SAGE 
real-time system developed for aircraft interception, to the critical innovation of the 
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SABER real-time airline reservation system. This was as much the key to affordable 
mass air travel as the wide bodied jet and, disintermediated through the internet, 
remains the core technology of budget airlines. 
The Cold War ARPANET origins of the Internet are well known, as are the 
survivability and web characteristics which were in part a response to the physical 
vulnerability of the SAGE system. The computer centres of this system were located 
at Strategic Air Command (SAC) bomber-bases, prime targets for any enemy nuclear 
strike. Allegedly this was for staffing reasons, since under General Curtis LeMay: 
SAC had secured the best quality officers' facilities, in the U.S. military and SAGE 
relied on the attentions of highly skilled and highly sought after technical personnel.  
At end of the Cold War the NSA's mission statement (publicly available at 
http://www.nsa.gov/about_nsa/mission.html) distinguished between external foreign 
signals intelligence and “classified and unclassified national security systems” In the 
post 9/11 environment, the civil dimension is represented by a separate Information 
Systems Security Organization (ISSO). (http://www.nsa.gov/isso/bao/index.htm|). 
The NSA promoted their own “Clipper” encryption chip as the answer to commercial 
security problems on the information superhighway2.  
Joint development and commercial programs provide a direct link between military 
and diplomatic concerns and the world of commerce. Despite measuring its 
computing resources in acreage, the NSA outsources data processing to commercial 
organisations such as TRW, also a major credit data agency, as illustrated in the 
eighties film “The Falcon and the Snowman” (see also Bamford, 1983).. Yet another 
link between military and commercial projects is through technique. The continued 
refinement of signals traffic analysis has led to the emergence of what Roger Clarke 
(1989) terms “dataveillance”. Both governments and private organisations like TRW 
are able to assemble revealing pictures of organisations and individuals through the 
correlation of individually trivial data. Clarke campaigned against the introduction of 
an “Australia Card” in the 1980s. Again, in the post- 9/11 environment fresh demands 
for the introduction of electronic identity cards for citizens are being made in the U.K. 
and elsewhere. 
                                                          
2 In one respect the NSA are returning technologies distantly descended from a German 
commercial patent to the world of business. In this context it is not surprising that there are 
claims that the U.S. signals intelligence community has from time to time acted in support of 
U.S. commercial interests through the interception of foreign business communications. 
(European Parliament, 2001) 
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At the workplace level, equivalent electronic surveillance was described in a 
Japanese electronics factory, where data derived from production equipment was 
used to discipline work teams (Sewell and Wilkinson,1992). Such coercive practices 
are now an accepted part of the call-centre economy. Constant monitoring of 
workers, consumers and customers represents the panopticon dream of rational 
decision making. 
Winning Wars, hot and cold 
In the post 9/11 environment, the urgency of Cold War data analysis has returned. 
Surveillance and intelligence are once again seen as the thin line separating us from 
oblivion. It is therefore worth considering debates which arouse around the 
effectiveness of the contribution of code braking to the conduct of World War II. 
The narratives derived from wartime experience provide momentum to this 
process and Bletchley Park has been re-incorporated in the UK's national narrative 
and is now itself the subject of revisionist arguments. Clive Ponting, (1995) in a 
review of a fictionalised account of work at Bletchley Park, cautions against the trend 
towards the glamourisation of intelligence. He argues that the Soviets had no access 
to Enigma, yet engaged 90% of German army for much of war, that a crucial black-
out in North Atlantic data due to the addition of a fourth rotor to the naval Enigma 
machine in 1942 robbed the allies of access to data during the key period of the 
Battle of the Atlantic, which they still won. For him the key to victory was material 
superiority plus the immense causalities inflicted on and meted out by the Soviet 
Union. In contrast, Winterbotham argues that the main problem was the level of 
secrecy itself, arguing that U.S. General Mark Clark did not share his ultra 
information with subordinates, and pursued his own agenda to become “liberator of 
Rome” rather than taking the opportunity to defeat German forces elsewhere. 
Undoubtedly Air Marshal Dowding’s access to the Luftwaffe’s’ daily orders for the 
Battle of Britain ahead of the German squadron commanders ensured that Russia 
was not facing Germany alone. Ponting’s view is also Eurocentric. The advances 
made in cryptography at Bletchley Park were applied in the Pacific, with a British 
Special Liaison Unit being located in Brisbane to work with U.S., and Australian 
code-breakers. The separate U.S. ability to break the main Japanese naval code JN-
25 allowed them to engineer the key victory at Midway. As late as 1976, however, the 
Hollywood version of the battle attributed the location of the Japanese task force to 
U.S. Admiral Nimitz’s intuition.  
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The U.S. National Security Agency claims that the Pacific war was shortened by 
one year through the defeat of Japanese military codes. The revisionist account 
which followed the publication of Winterbotham’s Ultra story legitimated the massive 
post-war infrastructure developed by the GCHQ, successor to GCCS in the U.K. and 
the National Security Agency (NSA) in the United States.  
War Dividends 
The modern information and communication technologies derived from the 
Second World War innovations are essential to the level of control required over back 
offices and subsidiary plants located across national boundaries. They are at the 
therefore central to developments in the global economy which have replaced the 
spatial hierarchy involving resources, manufacturers and consumers by a complex 
layering of labour and resource markets. 
Inspired by the new organisational relationships made possible by the merging of 
computer and communication technologies (ICTs), observers such as Negroponte 
(1995) and Mitchell (1995) argue for the transformative potential of new forms of 
networked organisation and “virtual” workplaces.  
The strategies of transnational corporations resemble the placing of stepping 
stones as much as the construction of production chains (Little & Grieco, 2003). 
Inward investors can pick their distributed points of presence from a beauty parade of 
aspiring recipients, seeking the most favourable infrastructures and government 
support, regardless of jurisdiction (Lipietz, 1987). 
The growing separation between intellectual capital and physical production has 
consequences for both core and peripheral economies. Lipietz (1992) argues that the 
ability to separate production from consumption in these systems signals the end of 
the “Fordist compromise” which underpinned the Keynsian social-democratic 
paradigm. Harvey (1990) points out that Ford significantly increased wages when he 
introduced his five-dollar, eight-hour day in 1914 in conjunction with his moving 
production line. He saw the workers as an integral part of a production and 
consumption process. Production workers remote from the destination market no 
longer need to be paid sufficiently well to consume the products of their own labour. 
The result of these changes is a complex layering of labour markets, both internal 
and external to the developed economies driving the globalisation process. Harvey 
regards this post-Fordist situation as a regime of flexible accumulation which is tightly 
organised through its geographical dispersal and flexible responses to labour 
 9
Little                                                                                                         From Bletchley Park to the NSA 
markets, and which is even more reliant on the creation of scientific and technical 
knowledge.  
New locational strategies allowed white collar work from the US mainland to be 
relocated off-shore to the Caribbean as far back as the 1980s, and "front office" tasks 
in prestigious locations have been divided from "back office" tasks relegated to the 
more local periphery of outer suburbia. Less developed regions find themselves 
increasingly in competition for such lower value work, and their infrastructure is likely 
to be developed primarily to support it. At the same time, potential consumers with 
limited economic resources are less able to influence the direction of development of 
technologies, artifacts and services which are targeted at the most lucrative 
component of global markets. Across the new networked economy as a whole 
research and development, raw materials sources and routine manufacturing, final 
assembly, markets and after-market support, are increasingly co-located. The 
emergent global system is one of complex inter-penetration of peripheries and cores 
and these terms now refer to competence in the underpinning information and 
communication infrastructure, rather than physical location.  
These innovative forms appear to alter the relationship between organisational 
size and performance. The contemporary notion of the “network organisation” and 
decreasing Internet costs appear to present an opportunity for smaller players to 
access resources from and to compete within global networks. However, using the 
reduction on transaction costs delivered by ICTs, larger firms can restructure to enter 
niche markets yet still draw on their wider resource base. Castells (1996) describes a 
form of “network enterprise” which is composed of components of larger 
corporations, collaborating in specific spatial and temporal circumstances, while the 
main companies are still pursuing global strategies of direct competition. Castells is 
describing a mechanism by which larger corporations can achieve some of the agility 
of smaller competitors. While additional accessibility and flexibility is also available to 
smaller players, larger firms can restructure into networks which can enter niche 
markets yet still draw on their wider resource base, presenting a formidable 
challenge to smaller and medium scale players. Monolithic large scale planning is 
being replaced by opportunistic niche infiltration. 
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Reversing the Panopticon surveillance by the surveilled 
The technologies which have enabled military and managerial surveillance of 
distributed resources also, paradoxically, enable the communities so scrutinised to 
develop their own distributed strategies and patterns of relationships with external 
parties.  
While the post-Cold war period has seen the accelerated formation of global 
relationships, complexity is being added by the re-assertion of older identities and 
allegiances against the background of erosion of state sovereignty through 
international dispensations from the WTO and an expanding European Union 
(Delamaide, 1994; Dicken 2003). As a consequence, the interaction between 
intervention and location has also strengthened.  
The key technologies of the Internet and World Wide Web do offer opportunities 
for voices and visions voices from geographically disparate locations to enter the 
world of global communication.  
Castells has described “informational politics in action” (Castells 1997 p.333). He 
is concerned that one aspect of globalisation, the reliance on simplified mass 
communication, inevitably reduces the complexity of political discourse. However, in 
the same volume he describes very different and complex forms of electronically 
mediated communication by dissident minorities: Zapatista rebels in Mexico and 
Militia groups in the U.S.A. In both cases movements premised on the championing 
of the local and specific and a rejection of the global economy are achieving a 
presence and a voice in a global arena through the appropriation of the technologies 
of globalisation. The laptop in the rainforest has become the latest info-cliché, but the 
Mexican Federal Government itself provides links to independent and critical 
coverage of events via its own web-site, shifting political discourse into cyberspace 
and in front of a limitless audience (Little, Holmes & Grieco 2000). Unions have taken 
the same route in response to increasing restriction son  traditional physical actions 
(Hogan & Greene, 2002). 
Diasporic communities have been quick to seize the potential of these enabling 
technologies. These can build a dynamic between traditional cultural practices, 
modern communication forms to provide an enrichment of global symbolic life. There 
is a symbiosis between the use of the Internet for e-commerce purposes and the 
maintenance of living and differentiated cultures, a pattern which is already evident in 
Canada, Africa and Indonesia (Little, Holmes & Grieco, 2000). Miller and Slater 
(2000) explore the question of local improvisations in the West Indies through the 
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case of the Trinidadian diaspora. They describe how Trinidadians undertake a 
distinctive set of social activities on the global Internet. 
The rise of the portal metaphor as an organiser of web access has allowed 
countries such as Estonia, to provide public access in its own Finno-Ugric language 
(Abbate, 2000). The portal is a home page which provides structured links into 
resources appropriate to its users. As an organising device it can reduce search time 
for newer users, and through interposing “front-end” translation software can 
overcome the language barrier of the predominantly English language web3.  
New technology can assist the civic empowerment of the individual in relation to 
the state and also the capability of remote locations to influence the world of global 
government and global commerce: there are now powerful electronic 
counterbalances to historical policy remoteness (Little, Holmes & Grieco, 2001). 
The World Bank recognised the role of knowledge in the 1998-99 “World 
Development Report” (World Bank, 1998) and is currently re-branding as the 
Knowledge Bank. Stephen Denning, formerly Director of Knowledge Management for 
the Bank has presented this as a necessary dialogue between all parties concerned 
with development process (Denning and Grieco, 2000). A component of this 
realignment is the development of a web portal for Global Development Knowledge. 
The Bank has opened a web-based debate with non-governmental organisations 
which has inevitably raised the issue of power relationships. These can be seen in 
the framing of access pathways by the resource rich on behalf of the resource poor.  
In Japan, the Internet has been widely used for political debate, for example over 
airport location and development in the Kansai region. The Japan Local Government 
Center has set up a site through which it links with local governments globally to 
explore solutions to new urban problems.  
On-line electronic petitions systems have been established in Scotland (see 
Griffin, 2003) and for the UK as a whole. SMS text as well as traditional postal voting 
has been trialed at local government elections in an attempt to increase voter turnout. 
In California the notion of “community informatics” has been used to justify the 
provision of access to information previously freely available, but increasingly 
commercialised (Pitkin 2001). Across Europe city governments are co-operating 
across national borders through fibre optic technologies and other forms of electronic 
networking in the identification of municipal problems shared and solutions sought. 
                                                          
3 For a taxonomy of the portals developed by non-governmental and civil organisations, see Surman, 
(2002) 
 12
Little                                                                                                         From Bletchley Park to the NSA 
Similarly within the European Union locations along particular lines of transport 
communication have begun to co-operate electronically in the management of traffic. 
The models of networking already present in the real world counter the view that 
global communications flatten cultural terrain in favour of the dominance of modes 
and material practices determined by global economic leaders, most particularly the 
United States (Little, Grieco & Holmes, 2001). 
Conclusion 
The creative nexus central to Allied success in WWII established the framework 
of Cold War Civil military informatisation. The ICTs which drive the current form of 
globalisation extend the post-Cold War military dispensation, both in high tech 
weaponry and in information warfare at all levels from electronic countermeasures to 
broadcast propaganda. The military trajectory of surveillance leads us to cruise 
missile diplomacy. These gunboats of the twenty-first century, targeted through high 
technology surveillance, have become the weapon of first resort of an untrammelled 
super power. 
The civilian trajectory can be traced through the 1980’s AI projects to current 
attempts at “knowledge extraction”. These reflect an assumption of the ultimate 
superiority of the high level abstraction of data.  
However, a new paradigm is emerging from the interstices of this technical 
dispensation as a bottom-up and networked response, The feedback loop of systems 
theory and cybernetics set out by Beer (1972) is now incorporating the intentionality 
of those on the receiving end, bringing the possibility of a new paradigm both for both 
management and governance, built upon yet contradicting the Cold War legacy. 
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